Stock option adoptions by IPO firms account for about one-third of Japanese stock option adoptions during 1997-2000. Non-IPO firms that adopt stock options tend to decrease financial institutions' ownership levels less than the average whereas reduce other corporations' ownership levels more than the average. The result suggests firms that care more about shareholder wealth decrease cross-shareholdings as well as issue stock options. However, such firms need to keep shareholdings by financial institutions to prevent increases in agency costs of debt. Finally, we do not find a significant change in firms' operating performance surrounding stock option adoptions.
Introduction
Japanese corporate governance structures have been somewhat different from U.S. ones. Keiretsu affiliations and main banks have a major role in the Japanese corporate governance (Aoki et al., 1994; Prowse, 1992) . Cross-shareholdings among listed firms have released managers from threats of hostile takeovers. Managerial compensations have given a weak incentive to maximize shareholder value to managers (Kaplan, 1994) . As a result, the traditional governance structure has made managers care less about shareholder wealth.
However, the Japanese corporate governance shows a remarkable change in the late 1990s; Japanese companies adopt new governance devices that give managers an incentive to maximize shareholder value. Since stock options are permitted in 1997, many companies have adopted options in the managerial compensation. Companies began to have outside directors to make the boards more effectively monitor managements. These changes imply that Japanese corporate governance began to care more about shareholder value.
Using Japanese data, we investigate firms' ownership structure and operating performance changes surrounding stock option adoptions. If a firm's corporate governance structure is optimally designed, adding a new governance device may deviate the firm's governance structure from the optimal one; thus, the firm must adjust existing governance instruments associated with a new governance device adoption. We explore whether Japanese companies adjust their existing governance structures when adopting stock options.
There is another perspective that motivates us to analyze ownership structure changes when Japanese firms adopt stock options. Recent Japanese companies decrease cross-shareholdings that have made the managers care less about shareholder wealth; firms adopt stock options and abolish crossshareholdings for a same reason. This fact gives rise to the prediction that firms that adopt stock options decrease cross-shareholdings more.
Finally, we investigate operating performance changes pre-and post-stock option adoptions to explore whether the Japanese corporate governance reform has a positive impact on firm performance. Kato et al. (2005) investigate firms' operating performance changes during three years surrounding stock option adoptions; they report stock option adoptions improve firm performance. Considering that managers may have an incentive to manipulate the firms' accounting performance upward when receiving stock options (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004) , this paper extends the analytical period to seven years surrounding stock option adoptions, Investigating changes in ownership structure and operating firm performance, we should take into account that firms tend to adopt stock options pre-or post-IPOs; IPO firms can take a significant portion of firms that adopt stock options. Previous studies detect that IPO firms tend to reduce leverage levels, change ownership structures, and experience poor long run operating performance as well as issue stock options (Hamao et Roell, 1996) . The IPO firms' characteristics may produce a spurious relation between stock option adoptions and changes in ownership structures and operating performance. Dividing firms that adopt stock options into IPO firms and non-IPO firms, we try to disentangle changes in corporate governance structures and firm performance induced by stock option adoptions from those associated with IPOs.
Our empirical results are summarized as follows. Stock option adoptions associated with IPOs account for about one-third of all stock option adoptions during 1997-2000. IPO firms that adopt stock options tend to decrease directors' ownership levels and leverage whereas increase financial institutions' ownership levels surrounding the first option grant years. However, these changes may not be induced directly by stock option adoptions; the results may reflect IPO firms tendencies to substantially change their leverage and ownership structures as well as issue stock options.
Non-IPO firms that adopt stock options tend to decrease financial institutions' ownership levels less than the average whereas reduce other corporations' ownership levels more than the average. Firms that care more about shareholder wealth decrease crossshareholdings as well as issue stock options. However, such firms need to keep shareholdings by financial institutions to prevent increases in agency costs of debt. These results suggest firms need to adjust existing governance instruments when adding a new governance device.
Finally, firms' operating performance does not significantly change surrounding stock option adoptions. Our data support neither the idea that incentive effects provided by stock options improve firm performance nor the hypothesis that managers time stock option grants so that unexpectedly good performance is announced immediately after the grants.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief sketch of the traditional corporate governance and characteristics of Japanese stock options. Section 3 explains hypotheses. Section 4 describes sample selection procedures and data. Section 5 presents empirical results. Finally, section 6 summarizes this study.
Japanese corporate governance and stock options
Keiretsu affiliations and main banks have played an important role in the traditional Japanese corporate governance (Aoki et al., 1994; Prowse, 1992) . Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find that main banks dispatch personnel to a firm's board before it gets into financial crisis. 1 Another feature of the traditional governance is that firms have cared less about shareholder wealth. In the Japanese stock market, cross-shareholdings among listed companies have been developed; the cross-shareholdings weaken managers' incentive to maximize shareholder value by releasing them from treats of hostile takeovers.
Managerial compensation structures also have given managers a weaker incentive to increase shareholder wealth. In Japan, stock options have been banned for a long time. Kaplan (1994) argues that Japanese managers' cash compensations are more sensitive to negative earnings than it is in the U.S., even though it is linked to firm performance. Kaplan also finds that the level of managerial ownership is roughly one-half than that of U.S. top executives, and one-quarter if stock options are included.
However, the Japanese governance characteristics substantially changed during the 1990s. The serious reductions of share prices and Return on Equity (ROE) raised awareness that firms should adopt shareholder wealth-oriented corporate 1 Some previous studies emphasize negative aspects of keiretsu and main bank-centered corporate governance. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that close bank ties increase availability of financing, but not profitability. Kang and Stultz (1997) report a strongly significant negative relation between the ratio of loans to total debt in 1989 and the firm's stock return from 1990 to 1993. To grant stock options, Japanese firms must gain approval at their shareholder meetings. Within one year from that approval, the firm can actually award options. Uchida (2005) reports that the most common exercise period is five years in his sample; no firm adopts stock options whose exercise period is over 10 years to satisfy a condition for the taxqualified stock option. In most cases, the strike price is determined by multiplying the closing stock price at the end of the month before the grant month by 1.05.
Hypotheses

Stock option adoptions and existing governance devices
If a firm's corporate governance structure is optimally designed, adding a new governance device may divert the governance structure from an optimal one. This problem should be marked for the Japanese case in which many companies simultaneously adopt stock options after the Commercial Law amendment.
Stock options give managers a stronger incentive to maximize shareholder wealth. However, such an incentive may increase agency costs of debt; shareholders tend to undertake high-risk projects and forgo positive-NPV projects to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977 
Cross-shareholdings reduction and stock option adoptions
Recent Japanese companies tend to decrease crossshareholdings that weaken managers' incentive to maximize shareholders value. Many firms simultaneously adopt stock options to make managers care more about shareholder wealth; the abolition of cross-shareholdings and stock option adoptions are motivated by a same idea that firms should care more about shareholder wealth. This fact gives rise to the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 2: Firms that adopt stock options decrease cross-shareholdings.
Sample Selection and Data
Our sample consists of firms listed on the TSE, first section. Using Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQuest Database, we collected firms that adopt stock option plans as of March 2000. We identified the year when these firms got the first approval to grant options from their annual reports. These procedures offer us 201 firms that adopt stock options during 1997 to 2000.
For the 201 firms, we obtained ownership structure and financial data from Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQuest. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Over half of our sample firms got first the approval to grant options in 2000 (Panel A). Electric appliance firms adopt stock options most frequently; it is followed by wholesale service and machinery. Panel B indicates that firms that went public after 1995 account for approximately one-third of our sample firms. Likewise, about one-third of the firms adopt stock options within three years after or before IPOs (Panel C); stock option grants by IPO firms take a significant portion of Japanese stock option adoptions during 1997-2000. We should take this fact into account when analyzing changes in corporate governance structures and operating performance.
We use two leverage measures: (a) Leverage 1 = total liabilities / total assets ratio and (b) Leverage 2 = financial liabilities / (financial liabilities and book value of equity). For testing Hypothesis 2, we adopt financial institutions' ownership level and other corporations' ownership level as proxies for the degree of cross-shareholdings. We adopted three measures for firms' operating performance: (a) operating income-to-total assets ratio, (b) operating income-to-sales ratio, and (c) EBIT-to-total assets ratio.
We analyze corporate governance structure and operating performance changes during seven years surrounding the grant year (See Figure 1 
Empirical Results
Changes in directors' ownership surrounding first stock option adoptions
First, we investigate changes in directors' ownership levels surrounding stock option adoptions. Panel A of Table 2 finds the average directors' ownership level decreases from 10.1% at year -3 to 6.4% at year 3 (median decreases from 1.9% to 1.3%). The average change from year -3 to year 1 is -3.4% (median is -0.1%) and significantly different from zero. This evidence is consistent with Kato et al. (2005) and Ofek and Yermack (1997); directors tend to sell their firms' shares surrounding stock option grants.
Considering that managers tend to sell a significant portion of their companies' shares when the firm goes public, the result may represent an IPO firm' tendency to substantially change ownership structures and issue stock options; it would be important to investigate changes in directors' ownership levels for IPO and non-IPO firms respectively to disentangle the direct effect of stock option adoptions on directors' ownership levels from the spurious relation produced by IPO firms' characteristics.
We define IPO firms as companies that adopt stock options within three years after or before IPOs. There are 67 IPO firms in our sample; it accounts for one-third of the entire sample. Also, we define Non-IPO firms as companies that adopt stock options over 10 years after IPOs. This procedure offers us 113 Non-IPO firms.
Results are shown in Panels B and C of Table 2 . From year -1 to year 3, IPO firms decrease directors' ownership levels by 8.8% on average (median change is 4.4%) whereas Non-IPO firms do so by 0.4% (median change is 0.01%). This evidence suggests the finding by Kato et al. (2005) and Ofek and Yermack (1997) might represent IPO firms' pattern; managers tend to sell a significant portion of their companies' shares and simultaneously issue stock options when the company goes public.
The result also suggests additional incentive effects provided by stock options may be stronger for non-IPO managers than for IPO managers; stock option adoptions may increase agency costs of debt more for non-IPO firms than for IPO firms.
Leverage changes surrounding first stock option adoptions
Hypothesis 1-A predicts firms' capital structure changes surrounding stock option adoptions. Table 3 summarizes firms' leverage changes from year -3 to year 3.
For the entire sample, the average Leverage 1 decreases from 52.1% at year -3 to 43.3% at year 3 (median decreases from 52.3% to 42.7%). The average change from year -1 to year 3 is -4.8% (median change is -3.2%); it is significantly different from zero. Likewise, Leverage 2 decreases by 6.0% on average from year -1 to year 3 (the median reduction is 3.1%). Panels B and C of Table 3 indicate that both IPO and Non-IPO firms tend to decrease their leverage levels.
It would be important to analyze industry adjusted leverage levels because the average Japanese company tends to decrease leverage during the late 1990s. Table 4 reports changes in the industry adjusted leverage (subtract the industry median leverage from the raw variable). 3 The average sample firm increases the industry adjusted Leverage 1 by 1.4% from year -1 to year 3 (median increase is 2.4%). Likewise, the adjusted Leverage 2 increases by 3.7% from year -1 to year 3; it is significantly different from zero.
The evidence suggests firms that adopt stock options decrease their leverage levels less than the average; it contradicts Hypothesis 1-A. This finding is more pronounced for Non-IPO firms (Panel C of Table 4 ). The average Non-IPO firms' Leverage 1 (industry adjusted) increases from -6.2% at year -3 to -1.1% at year 3. The average sample firm increases the adjusted Leverage 1 by 3.7% from year -1 to year 3 (median increase is 3.5%); it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Hypothesis 1-A is not supported for Non-IPO firms.
A possible interpretation of this finding would be that firms that adopt stock options tend to have more growth opportunities; thus, it is difficult for such firms to substantially decrease leverage levels. Many previous studies argue that market-to-book ratio is positively associated with the likelihood that firms adopt stock options (Baber et Thus, we predict firms that adopt stock options can not reduce leverage because they need to spend cash flows in business projects rather than in repaying their debt. For testing this prediction, we compute percentage changes in fixed assets from year -1 to year 3 and relate it to the leverage change. Specifically, we equally divide Non-IPO firms into two groups according to the change in leverage and compare fixed assets changes between the two groups. Industry adjusted variables are used both for the changes in leverage and fixed assets.
Results are summarized in Table 5 . Panel A reports Non-IPO firms that increase Leverage 1 more than the median increase fixed assets by 10.6% on average whereas Non-IPO firms that increase Leverage 1 less than the median decrease fixed assets by 1.5%; the difference in the fixed assets change is statistically significant at the 5% level. Panel B shows a similar result though the statistical significance levels are marginal.
Panel C reports correlation coefficients between the changes in leverage and fixed assets; the correlations are positive and statistically significant. This evidence suggests non-IPO firms that adopt stock options tend less to decrease leverage because they have more growth opportunities; thus, Hypothesis 1-A is not supported. Non-IPO firms need to adjust other governance instruments to prevent increases in agency costs of debt when adopting stock options.
On marked contrast, Panel B shows the average IPO firm decreases the industry adjusted Leverage 1 from -7.0% at year -3 to -17.9% at year 3 (median decreases from -5.6% to -19.1%). The average Leverage 1 reduction from year -1 to year 3 is -2.9%; it is significantly different from zero (median change is -1.8%).
The result may be produced by an IPO firms' tendency to substantially decrease leverage as well as issue stock options (Roell, 1996); it may not induced directly by stock option adoptions.
Changes in financial institutions' and other corporations' ownership
Financial institutions' ownership levels
Non-IPO firms tend less to decrease directors' ownership levels and leverage when adopting stock options. Thus, Non-IPO firms need to increase shareholdings by financial institutions to prevent increases in agency costs of debt (Hypothesis 1-B) . Table 6 describes percentage changes in financial institutions' and other corporations' ownership levels (raw variables). Panel A (results for the entire sample) indicates the sample firms seems not to substantially change raw financial institutions' ownership levels; the average change from year -1 to year 3 is 0.8% (median is 0.4% increase).
Panels B and C of Table 6 reports ownership structure changes for IPO firms and Non-IPO firms, respectively. The average IPO firm significantly increases the financial institutions' ownership level. It may reflect the Japanese IPO firms' pattern; firms tend to increase banks' ownership levels following IPOs (Hamao et al., 2000; Kutsuna et al., 2002) . On the other hand, the average Non-IPO firm significantly decreases raw financial institutions' ownership levels. Considering that the average Japanese firm decreases the financial institutions' and other corporations' ownership level during the late 1990s, it would be necessary to analyze whether sample firms increase (decrease) the ownership levels than the TSE average. We make variables above the TSE mean (subtract the TSE mean from the raw ownership variable) and trace the adjusted variables' change (Table 7) .
Panel A of Table 7 shows the average financial institutions' ownership level increases from -9.1% (median is -8.1%) at year -3 to -2.3% (median is -2.8%). 4 The average change from year -1 to year 3 is positive (5.6%) and significantly different from zero at the 1% level; it is consistent with Hypothesis 1-B.
The result might be earned by a Japanese IPO firms' tendency to substantially increase banks' ownership levels after IPOs (Hamao et al., 2000 ; Kutsuna et al., 2002). For disentangling ownership structure changes induced by stock option adoptions from those associated with IPOs, we conduct a same test for IPO and Non-IPO firms, respectively (Panels B and C of Table 7 ). Both IPO and Non-IPO firms significantly increase financial institutions' ownership levels (above the TSE mean). The Non-IPO's firms' finding supports Hypothesis 1-B though the IPO firms' result may be produced by the Japanese IPO firms' tendency. Non-IPO firms need to decrease shareholdings by financial institutions less than the average to prevent increases in agency costs of debt.
Other corporations' ownership levels
Hypothesis 2 predict firms that care more about shareholder wealth may decrease cross shareholdings as well as adopt stock options. Panel A of Table 6 reports the sample firms substantially decrease shareholdings by other corporations (raw variable); the other corporations' ownership level decreases from 25.2% at year -3 to 20.7 % at year 3. The change from year -1 to year 3 is -2.8% (median is -3.0%). Panels B and C of Table 6 find both IPO and Non-IPO firms significantly decrease other corporations' ownership levels (raw variable) surrounding stock option adoptions. The result keeps unchanged when using the variable above the TSE mean (Panel A of Table 7 ). Considering that Non-IPO firms may be encumbered by crossshareholdings, the Non-IPO firms' result is consistent with Hypothesis 2; firms that care more about shareholder wealth tend to decrease crossshareholdings more than the average as well as adopt stock options. We conduct a same test for keiretsu firms to check the robustness of this interpretation. Other corporations' ownership levels of keiretsu firms may represent the degree of crossshareholdings may more accurately; the variable of Non-IPO firms sometimes includes corporate block shareholders. Each sample firm's keiretsu affiliation is obtained from Keiretsu no Kenkyu. We define keiretsu firms as companies that belong to a six major keiretsu group (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-ichi Kangyo) in the Keiretsu no Kenkyu. Results for keiretsu firms are shown in Table 8 . Panels A and B of Table 8 show keiretsu firms significantly decrease other corporations' ownership levels. Keiretsu firms that adopt stock options decrease cross-shareholdings with other corporations more than the average; the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Table 8 also finds keiretsu firms significantly increase the adjusted financial institutions' ownership levels whereas decrease the raw variable. Keiretsu firms decrease shareholdings by financial institutions less than the average; it is consistent with Hypothesis 1-B. Overall, non-IPO firms or keiretsu firms that care more about shareholder wealth tend to decrease cross-shareholdings with other corporations more than the average as well as adopt stock options. However, such firms decrease shareholdings by financial institutions less than the average to prevent increases in agency costs of debt. These firms seem to adjust ownership structures along with adopting stock options.
Stock option adoptions and operating performance
Finally, we analyze operating performance changes surrounding stock option adoptions. We report only industry adjusted performance measures (subtract the industry median from the raw performance variable). Results for the entire sample are described in Panel A of Table 9 . The average firm achieves almost same operating income-to-total assets ratio at years -3 and 3. The average change from year -1 to year 3 is -0.3% (median change is -0.1%); it is not statistically significant. The other performance measures do not show a significant increase surrounding the grant years. The results might be caused by IPO firms' characteristics; Previous studies report that firms experience poor long-run performance following IPOs (Jain and Kini, 1994; Kutsuna et al., 2002; Mikkelson et al., 1997). Disentangling the effect of stock option adoptions on firm performance from the impact of IPO firms, we conduct a same test for IPO and Non-IPO firms, respectively (Panels B and C of Table 9 ). Panels B and C show no significant change in the three performance measures both for IPO and Non-IPO firms. Our data do not find a positive effect of stock option adoptions on firms' operating performance. Table 9 also shows no substantial change in operating performance from year -1 to year 1; it is inconsistent with Kato et al. (2005) . 5 Our data do not support the idea that managers time stock option grants so that unexpectedly good performance is announced immediately after the option grants.
Concluding Remarks
The Japanese corporate governance shows a remarkable change in the late 1990s; Japanese companies adopt stock options in their managerial compensations and decrease cross-shareholdings. These changes mean that Japanese corporate governance began to care more about shareholder wealth. Using Japanese data, we investigate changes in firms' leverage, ownership structures, and operating performance surrounding stock option adoptions. Our empirical results are summarized as follows. Stock option adoptions associated with IPOs account for about one-third of all stock option adoptions during 1997-2000. IPO firms that adopt stock options tend to decrease directors' ownership levels and leverage whereas increase financial institutions' ownership levels surrounding the first option grant year. These changes may not be induced directly by stock option adoptions; the results reflect IPO firms tendencies to substantially change their leverage and ownership structures as well as issue stock options. Non-IPO firms that adopt stock options tend to decrease financial institutions' ownership levels less than the average whereas reduce other corporations' ownership levels more than the average. Firms that care more about shareholder wealth tend to decrease crossshareholdings as well as issue stock options. However, such firms need to keep shareholdings by financial institutions to prevent increases in agency costs of debt. These results suggest that firms need to adjust existing governance instruments when adding a new governance device.
Finally, firms' operating performance shows no significant change surrounding stock option adoptions. Our data support neither the idea that incentive effects provided by stock options improve firm performance nor the hypothesis that managers time stock option grants so that unexpectedly good performance is announced immediately after the grants. Table 3 Leverage changes surrounding first stock option adoptions Panel A: Entire sample Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 This table shows sample firms' percentage changes in direct ors' ownership levels surrounding t he first st ock opt ion grant year. IPO firms are companies t hat adopt st ock opt ions wit hin t hree years aft er IPOs or before IPOs. Non-IPO firms are companies that adopt st ock options over 10 years after IPOs. T-statistics test the null hypothesis that the variable's average change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Wilcoxon t est is for t he null hypot hesis t hat t he variable's median change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 Table 4 Industry adjusted leverage changes surrounding first stock option adoptions Panel A: Entire sample Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 Non-IPO firms are equally divided into two groups according to the leverage change. The changes in fixed assets are compared between the two groups (Panels A and B). Panel C reports correlation coefficients between the changes in leverage and fixed assets. All variables are industry adjused ones (subtract the industry median from the raw variable). T-statistics test the null hypothesis that t he average fixed assets changes are not different between the two groups. Wilcoxon test is for the null hypothesis that the median fixed assets changes are not different between the two groups. Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 This table shows sample firms' changes in financial institutions' ownership and other corporat ions' ownership levels surrounding the first stock opt ion grant year. IPO firms are companies that adopt stock options within three years after IPOs or before IPOs. Non-IPO firms are companies that adopt stock options over 10 years after IPOs. T-statistics test the null hypothesis that the variable's average change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Wilcoxon test is for the null hypothesis that t he variable's median change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Table 6 Percentage changes in financial institutions' ownership and other corporations' ownership Panel A: Ent ire sample Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 Y e a r r e l a t i v e t o t h e f i r s t o p t i o n g r a n t y e a r -3 This table shows sample firms' changes in financial institutions' ownership and other corporations' ownership levels surrounding the first stock option grant year. All variables are adjusted by the TSE mean (subtract the TSE mean from the raw variable). IPO firms are companies that adopt stock options within three years after IPOs or before IPOs. Non-IPO firms are companies that adopt stock options over 10 years after IPOs. T-statistics test the null hypothesis that the variable's average change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Wilcoxon test is for the null hypothesis that the variable's median change from year -1 to year 3 is zero. Operat ig income-t o-t ot al asset s rat io Mean -0.05% -0.23% -0.01% -0.07% -0.13% -0.13% -0.54% -0.53% Median -0.69% -1.17% -0.66% -0.29% -0.55% -0.70% -0.84% -0.09% Number of observations Table 9 Indust ry adjust ed operat ing performance changes surrouding first stock opt ion adoptions 
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